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Altair, the lunar lander element of NASA's Constellation program, was conducted in a different design environment 
than many other NASA projects of similar scope. Because of this relatively unique approach, there are a number of 
significant success stories that should be considered during the development of any future lunar landers or human 
spacecraft. This paper is divided into two separate themes; the first is the approach used during the conceptual 
design studies, including the systematic analysis cycles and the decision making process associated with each: and 
the second is a summary of the resulting lessons learned that were compiled after looking back at the lifetime of the 
Project. Altair was terminated before entering Phase B of its design, and was often criticized for being a very heavy 
and very large vehicle. While there was specific rationale for all of the decisions that led up to that configuration, 
future design cycles were specifically planned to re-address the mass challenge. Had the project continued, the 
deliberate, stepwise design process would have converged on an optimized lander design that balanced mass, risk, 
cost and capabilities. Some of the specific items that will be addressed in this paper include project development 
strategy, organizational approach and team dynamics, risk-informed design process, mission architecture constraints, 
mission key driving requirements, model-based systems engineering process, configuration studies, contingency 
considerations, subsystem overviews and key trade studies. The paper will conclude with a summary of the lessons 
identified during the Altair project and make suggestions for application to future studies. 
 
I. THE ALTAIR LUNAR LANDER DESIGN 
PROCESS 
 
Designing a new human lunar lander is a multi-
layer systems challenge. The Altair Project created a 
lander design that responded to the physics of 
spaceflight and limitations of human 
performance…while as a project balancing 
performance, cost, schedule and risk...while working 
within the integrated architecture performance, cost 
profile, schedule and integrated risk and reliability 
targets of NASA’s Constellation program…while 
fulfilling the policy directives of NASA’s strategic 
plan, Congress’ NASA Authorization Acts, and 
Administration/OMB/OSTP policy…and performing 
within budget guidance. This required a team with a 
true systems perspective – an understanding of how 
all the pieces fit together, at all levels. 
A lunar lander is a physics machine. The physics 
of lunar landing demands that the lander perform 
velocity changes - ~1000 m/sec to decelerate into 
lunar orbit, ~2000 m/sec to decelerate to a soft 
landing, and another 2000 m/sec to accelerate back 
into lunar orbit. Additionally, a lander must include 
life support to provide the physiological environment 
for the human crewmembers. Resultantly, much of 
the lunar lander “design space” is fixed by physics – 
large tanks of propellant surrounded by structure, an 
attenuation system for landing, and a pressurized 
volume for crew habitation. The designers of the 
Apollo mission understood the physics of the 
problem perfectly, even though they were inventing 
much of it for the first time. The Altair team’s 
challenge was to apply the lessons learned from 
Apollo, combined with the incremental 
improvements to technology from the past 4 decades. 
Not surprisingly, Altair bears some resemblance to 
the venerable Apollo Lunar Module – the physics of 
lunar landing is unchanged, the planform of the 
lander will reflect its functionality, and the 
technologies that have improved most dramatically 
(computers, avionics, composite structures) are 
mostly invisible at the vehicle level. So Altair looks 
like the big brother of the Apollo lunar Module – not 
because the Altair team wanted it to, but because the 
Apollo lunar module designers were pretty smart and 
understood the physics as well. Figure 1 illustrates 
the similarities and differences between the Apollo 
LM and Altair. 
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As the Altair project team began the Concept 
Studies portion of Project Formulation, what NASA 
defines as Pre-Phase A, it built upon the lessons and 
experiences of Apollo, the Space Shuttle, the 
International Space Station, and the early phases of 
the Orion project. NASA management challenged the 
Altair Team to find a way to develop the next human 
lunar lander more efficiently; to develop a lunar 
lander with the lowest reasonable mass, with high 
reliability and safety, at a low total cost and to meet 
the declared objective of returning humans to the 
moon by 2020. The Altair Team evolved, combined, 
and developed a number of different design and team 
integration practices to meet that challenge. As a 
result, many of the lessons identified during the 
Altair Project should be incorporated into the design 
of any future crewed lunar lander or human 
spacecraft design.  
This paper will provide an overview of the Altair 
design process and then discuss the primary lessons 
the Altair Team identified during Pre-Phase A and 
early Phase A (Concept and Technology 
Development). The team identified lessons associated 
with how a multi-discipline, inter-center team should 
function; how to implement a model-based systems 
engineering process; how to use a risk-informed 
design process at the beginning of a project that is 
based upon detailed engineering studies; and how to 
incorporate contractor input into the project 
formulation phase. 
 
II. ALTAIR SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
Altair consisted of four major components: an 
Ascent Module (AM), a Descent Module (DM), and 
an Airlock, as shown in Figure 2, and the Ares V 
Earth Departure Stage/Altair Adapter (EDSA). The 
AM is built around a crew cabin that serves as the 
primary habitable volume for the crew during at least 
the descent and ascent phases of the crewed sortie 
mission, and provides pressurized access to the 
Airlock and Orion. Altair’s DM main function is to 
deliver hardware (AM with crew, Airlock, cargo) to 
the surface of the Moon, and is built around the 
descent propulsion system, landing gear, and 
structure necessary to carry loads through all flight 
phases. The Airlock module provides ingress/egress 
access to the Altair AM in the Sortie mission mode. 
The Airlock allows the crew to perform split 
operations (e.g. two crew members perform EVA 
while two crew members remain in the Altair) and 
serves as one of the primary mechanisms used to 
control the transport of lunar dust into the AM. 
Different combinations of these modules yield 3 
separate configurations of the lander for crewed 
sortie missions (AM+DM+airlock), crewed outpost 
missions (AM+DM) and dedicated cargo delivery 
(DM only). 
This initial design was chosen with some 
thought. Over the past decades, NASA has well over 
100 discrete lander designs that explored the trade 
space variables of staging, delta-V split, propellant 
types, crew size, surface duration, launch 
configuration, landing configuration, launch shroud 
dimensions, abort capabilities, crew access, cargo 
accessibility and offloading, C.G. control, and a 
Figure 2  Altair p905-A Configuration 
Figure 1  Comparison of Apollo LM and Altair 
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myriad of other, often competing, design drivers. 
Based upon this history of studies, the Altair Project 
selected a configuration to begin its risk-informed 
design process – a two stage vehicle using a large, 
efficient LOX/LH2 stage for both landing and a 
piggyback LOI burn with the Orion vehicle attached, 
a small, lightweight ascent stage for crew habitation 
and “flight deck” functions, and a separate airlock. 
This choice of initial configuration was a 
necessary starting point to initialize the risk-informed 
design process, and has been held constant to 
facilitate the design process. Freezing a design early 
in the process does create a risk that this initial (likely 
non-optimal ) design choice becomes confused with 
THE ultimate design. However, an important step 
that was been inserted into the Altair design process 
is to periodically “step back” and re-evaluate the 
vehicle configuration to assess if the team is pursuing 
the most optimum design.  
  
III. RISK INFORMED DESIGN 
The Altair project is using a design approach that 
is unique to NASA’s human spacecraft. A typical 
NASA project first begins with a set of requirements 
that describe the entirety of the functions and 
performance a spacecraft must possess, and a vehicle 
is then designed to satisfy all of these requirements. 
This process results in a design that initially attempts 
to meet all requirements equally, and from which it is 
difficult to extract capability if the vehicle is found to 
exceed mass or cost limitations. Altair’s approach 
was to first design a vehicle that meets only a 
minimum set of requirements, and then incrementally 
add functions and performance back into the design. 
This approach allows the decision to accept each 
additional requirement to be informed by its 
individual impact to cost, performance and risk. This 
process was derived in part from NASA Engineering 
Safety Center Report NESC PR-06-108
1, “Design, 
Development, Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) 
Considerations for Safe and Reliable Human-Rated 
Spacecraft Systems”.  
After defining the “minimum functional” vehicle 
in the first Lander Design Analysis Cycle (LDAC-1), 
subsequent design cycles identified major risks that 
affected the safety of the crew (LDAC-2), and the 
success of the mission (LDAC-3). By using risks to 
inform these early design cycles, the Altair Project 
was able to identify the specific performance “cost” 
of each increment of crew safety and mission 
reliability that was added to the minimum spacecraft 
design. Residual spacecraft risks continued to be re-
evaluated as subsequent design cycles assessed the 
performance, cost and risk impacts of adding 
additional vehicle functionality, and other factors 
such as manufacturability and maintainability.  
The first step of the process is to establish a 
“minimum functionality” baseline design. This 
requires that the design team scrub the vehicle 
requirements back to a small number that described 
the essential functions and constraints of the lander. 
For the Altair lander these “core” requirements were 
to carry 4 crew to the surface for 7 days with 500 kg 
of payload, to loiter for up to 210 days at a polar 
outpost, to deliver 14,500 kg of dedicated cargo, to 
package within the Ares V shroud, to perform the 
lunar orbit insertion burn with the Orion spacecraft 
attached, to carry an airlock, and to work within the 
Constellation EOR-LOR architecture. Key 
constraints were control masses of 45,000 kg for 
crewed missions and 53,600 kg for cargo missions. 
From this minimum set of requirements, the 
design process was begun. “Minimum Functionality” 
is a design philosophy that begins with a vehicle that 
will perform the mission, and no more than that. It 
does not consider contingencies nor provide any 
added redundancy, and is approximately equal to a 
“single string” design approach. A “minimum 
functionality” vehicle is NOT a design that would 
ever be contemplated as a “flyable” design! What this 
design philosophy did provide was early, critical 
insight into the overall viability of the end-to-end 
Constellation transportation architecture - if a 
transportation architecture cannot “close” with a 
minimum functional lander, it will certainly not close 
when all the additional functionality is added back 
into the lander design. More importantly, the 
minimum functional lander design provides a starting 
point to make informed cost/risk trades and 
consciously buy down risk.  
Design standards were also scrutinized in 
formulating the minimum functional design. Existing 
NASA standards on redundant systems were put 
aside for the initial design, and were used only as one 
possible risk mitigation option in later design cycles. 
Technical standards were individually scrutinized – 
for example, the initial design used the nominal 
design standard structural factors of safety of 1.5 (and 
2.0 for pressure vessels), but left these open to trade 
during later design cycles.  
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This initial design cycle was completed in two 
months using a “collocated” team of engineers. The 
LDAC-1 design that resulted from the initial design 
cycle is shown in Figure 3. Though not a “flyable” 
vehicle, this design provides a starting point for 
informed risk reduction design cycles that were to 
follow. 
 
III.1  Altair Lander LDAC-1 (“Minimum 
Functional”) Design 
The primary LDAC-1 design figure of merit was 
to maximize the residual payload to the surface of the 
Moon with a crewed Lander. Large payloads landed 
with crewed missions were being investigated as an 
option to incrementally building lunar surface 
capabilities, and Constellation studies sought to know 
the maximum payload that could be delivered with 
lunar crews. One of LDAC-1 results was that a 
“minimum functional” vehicle (illustrating the 
extreme of maximizing delivered payload) could 
deliver less than 4 mt to the lunar surface. From this, 
the Constellation program concluded that small 
payloads could be delivered with crewed landers, but 
a cargo variant of the lander would be needed to 
build up a lunar outpost. 
The result of the initial design cycle was a 
bottoms-up design of a “single string” vehicle that 
met all the fundamental design reference missions 
and requirements, but no more. Each subsystem 
provided detailed engineering analysis and bottoms-
up design. Each then provided equipment lists, 
schematics and CAD models to Altair’s Integrated 
Vehicle Performance team, who assembled the 
products that describes the overall lander’s 
performance characteristics: A Master Equipment 
List listing over 2000 individual components, a 
Powered Equipment List, an integrated vehicle 
schematic, an integrated vehicle consumable and 
resource utilization analysis, and a detailed CAD 
model. 
 
III.2  Design Analysis Cycle 2: Buying back 
crew safety. 
The LDAC-1 design provided the baseline from 
which to identify vehicle risks in order to mature the 
design from one that was “minimum functional” to 
one that was “safety enhanced”. Risks that 
contributed most directly to the Loss of Crew (LOC) 
were first identified, and mitigation options then 
studied for these risks. Decision processes were 
developed for both selecting the LOC risks to be 
studied, and evaluating the mitigation options that 
would be incorporated into the LDAC-2 design. For 
this initial risk reduction cycle, the primary measures 
were mass and change to risk. 
Altair’s risk analysis team was key to the success 
of this cycle of risk-informed design. NASA safety 
personnel first identified crew safety risks and 
prioritized them so the design could be matured to 
increase the likelihood of crew survival. Beginning 
with the minimum functional LDAC-1 design, two 
lists of risks were developed, one using a top-down 
reliability model and the other using bottoms-up 
subsystem and vehicle fault trees and hazard 
analyses.  
All risk inputs were referred to a Risk 
Prioritization Team (RPT), comprised of Safety and 
Vehicle Engineering personnel, and Altair’s Chief 
Engineer. This team took on the complex task of 
synthesizing the results from the Lander Hazard 
Analysis, Lander Reliability Tool, and Subsystems 
Single Point Failure Assessments. From these inputs, 
the team compiled top composite risks, and created 
task sheets detailing 28 individual studies that were 
assigned to the Altair team.  
Subsystem risks, vehicle-wide risks such as 
micrometeorites radiation threats, and trajectory 
dispersions were all identified and mitigation 
measures studied. Additionally, aborts were “bought 
back” into the design as an additional mitigation 
against LOC. The end result was an “expenditure” of 
almost 2000 kg of mass (including both dry mass and 
propellant) for a 1.5 order of magnitude decrease in 
LOC probability. 
LDAC-2 results are plotted in Figure 3. The 
probability of Loss of Crew is read from the stacked 
bars with the scale on the left Y axis, and the change 
of mass “available for payload” is plotted by a blue 
line using the Y axis on the right. The stacked bars 
are further broken down to show the contribution of 
individual subsystems to the overall LOC metric. The 
composite of all decisions made in LDAC-2 to  
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reduce Altair’s LOC probability resulted in the mass 
available for payload being reduced from 3652 kg (in 
the minimum functional, single-string LDAC-1 
lander design) to 1671 kg. This still exceeds the 500 
kg of payload required for the lander to deliver, but 
does not yet include the “buy back” of Loss of 
Mission (LOM) risks or the addition of additional 
capabilities. LOC risk was improved from 
approximately 1 in 6 (LDAC-1) to 1 in 206, which 
begins to approach the 1 in 250 requirement for 
Altair lander LOC. 
Analyzing Loss of Crew risks, identifying 
mitigation options, and choosing design solutions that 
optimized risk buydown and mass performance gave 
rise to a number of useful observations. Most 
notably, full redundancy was usually the most 
massive and frequently NOT the most effective 
option for improving LOC. Analyzing options other 
than full redundancy, however, adds technical 
challenge and consumes a greater amount of effort 
than applying simple design “rules of thumb”. A 
bonus is that the design team ends up much more 
intelligent on risk and design drivers. Another lesson 
learned is that one or more quantitative risk tools are 
necessary to inform good design decisions. The 
Altair team combined PRA-based lander reliability 
model with tops-down Fault Trees and bottoms-up 
Single Point Failure identification to assess the 
breadth of risks. Finally, it will always be necessary 
to correlate engineering judgment with the results 
that risk tools produce. The Altair team did not rely 
solely on tool results, but used the results to focus 
technical discussion of specific risks. During the 
analysis of specific risk mitigations, designers also 
sought to understand the analytical risk modeling 
when a result did not correlate with their engineering 
experience. The risk tools ultimately become an aid 
that the designers interacted with, and each design 
cycle improves both the tools’ calibration and the 
designers’ understanding of design and risks. 
Ultimately, design for Minimum Risk proved 
valuable in building a smart design team. 
III.3  LDAC-3: Buying back mission reliability 
For the third Analysis Cycle analyzed safety and 
reliability design changes that target the highest Loss 
of Mission (LOM) risks residual in the LDAC-2 
lander design. A Risk Prioritization Team, similar to 
that used in LDAC-2, was tasked with synthesizing 
the outputs of an updated Fault Tree, Lander 
Reliability Model, and subsystem-identified Single 
Point Failures as shown in Figure Y. From these 
sources, the RPT identified the fundamental LOM 
risks and created analysis tasks that were assigned to 
either Altair subsystems or Integrated Vehicle leads. 
Each of these tasks will result in decision packages 
that present options for “buying back” each LOM 
risk using redundant systems, dissimilar redundancy, 
highly reliable components, increased testing, and 
other methods to decrease risk. 
In addition to LOM risks, LDAC-3 also 
incorporated “global access” functionality decisions 
made in collaboration with Constellation Lunar 
Architecture Team (CxAT-Lunar) transportation 
architecture studies. Extensive sensitivity studies 
were performed to determine the combined effect of 
launch vehicle capability, lander LOI delta-V, LLO 
loiter duration, and lunar global access coverage. 
These studies concluded that Constellation program 
global access requirements could be satisfied with a 
combination of 4 additional days of LLO loiter, and 
by sizing Altair’s tanks for an LOI maneuver of 1000 
m/sec (though the tanks would be filled only to 950 
m/sec LOI for the majority of missions). 
Loss of Mission risk mitigations and global 
access capabilities will be incorporated into the 
vehicle closure segment of the LDAC-3 design cycle, 
along with improved subsystem and spacecraft 
design maturity. 
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Figure 3. LDAC-2 Summary Metrics – Probability 
of Loss of Crew, Mass Available for Payload 
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Figure 4.  Altair Project Lander Configuration and 
Performance Maturation thru LDAC-3 
 
III.4  Requirements Analysis Cycles (RAC) 1 
and RAC 2.  
Following the series of analysis cycles that 
stepwise followed NESC PR-06-108
2
, the Altair 
Project Office undertook two RACs in order to 
mature the Altair requirement set and assess which 
ones were truly necessary versus those that required 
further scrutiny. Although no major changes were 
made to the vehicle during these cycles, a variety of 
maturation studies were pursued in order to achieve a 
better understanding of vehicle performance. These 
resulted in potential changes that were then decided 
upon in LDAC-4 to begin reassessment of the 
vehicle’s overall configuration.  
This period of time was also used to develop 
design detail behind sixteen major variants of the DM 
main propellant tank configurations. Of these sixteen 
tank options, the team selected three tank 
configurations for which to develop structural 
designs, due to favorable assessments of tank mass, 
propulsion system operability, and tank 
manufacturability. Using these three tank options, the 
structures team developed five Descent Module 
structural options. At the end of RAC-2, two of these 
options were selected for further consideration as a 
part of future vehicle-level trade studies, in addition 
to the baseline configuration, with one option being 
put on hold pending further discussions with the Ares 
V team.  
Finally, the safety and risk assessment team 
continued to refine the vehicle’s quantitative risk 
model during this period. As a result, while no 
material changes were made to the design, the 
vehicle’s loss of crew risk posture decreased from a 
value of 1 in 256 to a value of 1 in 277 and the loss of 
mission risk posture remained constant at 1 in 22. 
III.5  LDAC-4: Incorporating Requirements 
and System System Definition Trades 
The focus of LDAC-4 was to include 
requirements in the vehicle design that had not 
previously been satisfied, but were ready to be 
implemented as a result of the maturation efforts of 
RAC-1 and RAC-2. These requirements spanned the 
following areas: 
 Global Access Coverage 
 Contingency EVA Capabilities 
 Life Support Cabin Air Monitoring, 
Contingency Supply, and Vestibule 
Pressurizations 
 Crew Personal Protective Equipment 
 High Definition Video transmittal, Data 
Storage, and C3I Protocols 
 Increased geometric antenna coverage and 
simultaneous links 
 Ascent Module Disposal 
 Potable Water (Hot and Cold) Performance  
In addition to new requirements, vehicle 
maturation changes were worked into the vehicle 
design. Some of the most significant changes were as 
follows: 
 Command and data handling system 
architecture was switched from a centralized 
design to a distributed system design.  
 The landing loads and dynamics were 
assessed with higher fidelity models 
 A line-item budget was established for the 
DM propellant. 
 Boil-off calculations for the liquid hydrogen 
in the DM main propellant tanks were 
refined. 
 The propellant scavenging hardware used to 
scavenge gases from the DM propellant 
tanks for use by the fuel cell and the crew 
was reassessed. 
 Improved modeling and line sizing of the 
DM pressurization system led to a 110 kg 
decrease in the threat that was being held for 
propellant tank imbalance. 
As a result of all of these changes, the Sortie 
vehicle’s total expected vehicle mass decreased by 
2,311 kg in the bottoms-up lander design. The 
LDAC-1 LDAC-1DLLPO Design Cycle:
Sortie Mission
Ascent Module
Hab Module
Descent Module
PMR
Unallocated
Cargo Mission
Descent Module
PMR
Unallocated
Crew to Outpost Mission
Ascent Module
Descent Module
PMR
Unallocated
LDAC-2
“Minimum Functional” design
8.4 m Ares V shroud, 45 t control mass
“Safety Enhanced”
10 m Ares V shroud
5,340 kg
1,843 kg
33,976 kg
3,511 kg
331 kg
33,743 kg
2,304 kg
14,136 kg
5357 kg
33,868 kg
3,009 kg
2,766 kg
5,075 kg
949 kg (Airlock only)
32,718 kg
2,858 kg
3,652 kg
34,248 kg
1,974 kg
17,378 kg
5,356 kg
32,684 kg
2,691 kg
4,269 kg
5,300 kg
1,053 kg (Airlock only)
33,845 kg
3,130 kg
1,671 kg
35,656 kg
2,135 kg
15,808 kg
5,525 kg
33,711 kg
2,940 kg
2,824 kg
LDAC-3
“Reliability Enhanced”
Design maturation
6,494 kg
1,173 kg (Airlock only)
33,483 kg
2,008 kg
1,254 kg
37,177 kg
2,003 kg
14,794 kg
6,763 kg
33,099 kg
1,899 kg
2,653 kg
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addition of new requirements also had a negative 
effect on the baseline vehicle’s safety and reliability.  
 
IV. SPACECRAFT DESIGN LESSONS 
In 2010, the Constellation program was 
cancelled, and a “lessons learned” identification 
process was conducted as part of the Program’s 
closeout activities. Inputs were solicited in the 
categories of Management, Systems Engineering & 
Requirements, Organization, Communication, 
Resources, Technical Authority, Planning, 
Manufacturing, Test and Verification, Design and 
Development. The following is a summary of the 
Altair Project’s inputs to the lessons learned 
activities. These lessons form an excellent basis for 
any new human spacecraft program beginning Pre-
Phase A and Phase A conceptual design activities. 
 
IV.1  Risk-informed design should be started 
during conceptual design 
Risk-informed design provides early, critical 
insight into the overall viability of the end-to-end 
architecture, and provides a starting point to make 
informed cost/risk trades so that risks can consciously 
be bought down. The Altair team has used the 
education afforded by risk-informed design to look at 
risk reduction in its many forms and not to blindly 
apply fault tolerance rules or preconceived risk 
reduction solutions. The process inherently produces 
risk metrics for each added capability, and cost 
analysis can easily be added to facilitate evaluation of 
the true cost and risk changes that accompany each 
added capability. Perhaps most importantly, risk-
informed design creates a true “Smart Buyer” team 
that inherently understands the balance of risk drivers 
and mass performance within the design. 
 The initial design analysis cycle (DAC-1) for 
the Altair Lunar Lander provided a spacecraft with 
"minimum functionality." Minimum function was 
defined to mean that the lander was designed to meet 
the primary key driving requirements, not the 
complete set of Level II Lander requirements. 
Primarily, it meant that the vehicle and it's 
subsystems were designed for zero fault tolerance 
and no contingency operations. It was understood 
that this design did not represent a flyable vehicle, 
rather this provided a theoretical vehicle that could 
perform a lander mission if everything worked with 
100% reliability, obviously an unrealistic design 
point. However, during DAC-2 the risks that would 
result in Loss of Crew (LOC) failures were identified 
and specific vehicle, subsystem, and component trade 
studies were performed to identify the reliability 
improvement as a function of the mass of the 
alternatives. The resulting vehicle concept was 
referred to as the Increased Safety vehicle. This 
process was repeated during DAC3 for the Loss of 
Mission (LOM) risks to provide the Enhanced 
Mission Success vehicle. A tool was developed using 
probabalistic risk assessment component failure data, 
including data from the Space Shuttle and ISS PRA, 
to quantify the risk associated with the subsystem and 
component alternatives. The term "risk-informed 
design" is used because the design decisions were 
literally" informed" by the quantified risk information 
instead of using a rule-based decision process. By 
using this process, the Project Manager was able to 
systematically add back safety, reliability, and 
capability with a more complete understand of the 
integrated effect on the spacecraft. Implementing this 
type of process early in the design process is crucuial 
because changing the design later to reduce mass is 
difficult and expensive. 
 
Risk-informed design works best when the 
configuration of the spacecraft is held (steady), so as 
not to introduce additional variables into the design. 
It is also a time consuming process (the first 3 design 
analysis cycles took the Altair team approximately 24 
months to complete), and during that time 
requirements may change, interfaces with other 
elements may become better defined, and the lander 
design itself will mature. To (focus/ best 
suit/optimize) the risk-based design effort, the Altair 
team chose to hold the vehicle design constant 
throughout the design cycles, with a plan to revisit 
vehicle configuration once LOC and LOM 
“buyback” cycles were complete. With the 
completion of the risk and reliability design cycles, 
the next step is to prioritize the configuration and 
maturation studies that would have the greatest 
impact on the vehicle design. Altair considered a list 
of over 200 potential configuration/maturation trades, 
and from that list chose the following studies as the 
basis for a special Trade Analysis Cycle (TAC) that 
was inserted into the vehicle’s development schedule.  
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IV.2  A multi-center in-house Skunkworks® 
team is a good way to initialize new projects 
In late 2006 a study was performed to identify 
options for initiating development of the lunar lander 
to meet the Human Lunar Return by 2020. That study 
determined that insufficient time and budget were 
available to execute a lunar lander development 
project using a standard NPR 7120.5 process with 
contractors performing pre-phase A and phase A/B 
studies. The Lunar Lander Project Office was stood 
up to implement more streamlined and efficient path 
through the project formulation phase. The key tenets 
of the approach included: 1) NASA Administrator 
buy-in to the approach and broad lattitude to deviate 
from NASA policy, as needed; 2) began with a small, 
hand-picked team made up of spacecraft and 
subsystem design experts from across the agency; 3) 
developed and communicated a set of guiding 
principles; and 4) began the project by co-locating 
the mult-center team in a single facility for the first 2 
months of the project, then maintained that 
cohesiveness with regular short-term co-located 
meetings. 
Altair’s experienced showed that a small, 
focused multi-disciplinary in-house NASA team is a 
very effective way to initiate the formulation phases 
of new projects. 
 
IV.3  Model-based systems engineering should 
be used to provide mission functional modeling for 
requirement decomposition. 
The Constellation program initiated the 
requirements development process by determining 
the capabilities needed from each of the systems in 
the architecture to accomplish the mission, and levied 
the requirements through various documents, 
including the Constellation Architecture 
Requirements Document (CARD).  As a project 
within a large program, it is the project’s 
responsibility to implement a more detailed 
assessment of the mission to validate the 
requirements levied on it from the program and 
determine if they are necessary and achievable, as 
well as to scrutinize the mission for latent 
requirements. The Altair Project utilized Models-
based Systems Engineering (MBSE) as the approach 
to requirements development. MBSE focuses on 
building data models that clearly depict the 
operational flow of the mission. These hierarchical 
models manage the complexity of the mission and 
functional allocations, and make excellent integration 
products for a group review between different 
organizations for consistency in assumptions. The 
operational models can then be analyzed to determine 
the functionality the vehicle must possess to enable 
these operations. The models are kept in the 
requirements database for the program, and cross-
references between the vehicle functions and the 
mission phases the functions are used in serve as 
validation of the function. Further, linkages between 
the functions and requirements that enforce them on 
the design provide complete traceability from 
requirements to the concept of operations. Finally, by 
assigning durations to the activities within the 
operational models, they can be simulated to provide 
a complete timeline of the mission from the same 
models that are being used to establish vehicle 
functionality. By developing these common products, 
a single model set becomes the authoritative source 
for the requirements, functionality and operations, 
thereby improving the quality of the requirements, 
integrating the various organizations within the 
projects and minimizing disconnects.  
Models-based systems engineering streamlines 
requirements development and validation by 
developing integrated products between the 
Requirements, Design and Operations communities, 
and should be used to provide an integrated set of 
products upon which architecture, element, system 
and subsystem requirements can be sequentially 
decomposed. 
 
IV.4  Regular co-locations are essential to using 
geographically distributed teams 
 The diversity provided by a geographically 
distributed (in the case of Altair, a multi-NASA-
center) team is worth the extra effort it requires. 
While teleconferences and internet assisted virtual 
meetings are required, the key to operating with a 
multi-center team is to periodically bring the team 
together to work in a single location. When Altair 
began as the Lunar Lander Project Office, it co-
located approximately 60 people in a single small 
building at Johnson Space Center for a period of 8 
weeks. This period allowed the team to get through 
most of the forming, storming, norming, and began 
performing as a high performance team before 
returning to their home centers and organizations.  
The project maintained the team cohesiveness by 
planning a robust travel budget that allowed a 
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significant part of the team to get back together for 
three or four days of jointly working together. These 
periodic co-locations were rotated amongst the 
centers; and to the extent possible, the team stayed in 
the same hotels, went to dinner together, and spent 
time socializing. This approach ensured that the 
personal relationships that were initially formed were 
maintained, and that as new members joined the 
team, they were more quickly assimilated. The 
interpersonal bond towards the Lunar Lander team 
was tested as inter-center institutional competition for 
roles and responsibilities emerged, however the 
strength of the team prevented it from getting in the 
way of the work. 
 
IV.5  Detailed design during pre-phase-A and 
early phase-A can identify important issues 
 The cost and schedule associated with 
performing significant engineering design during the 
project formulation phase provides a tremendous 
return on the investment. One of the key initial tasks 
for the Altair Project was to develop a preliminary in-
house design within six to nine months, and the 
emphasis was to focus on performing significant 
design, i.e., focus on the “D” in LDAC. The detailed 
design work allowed us to validate and identify 
weaknesses in the parametric modeling.  A few 
notable examples can illustrate this point. The mass 
of the landing legs could not be easily scaled from 
the Apollo Lunar Module due to the dramatic size 
difference between it and the hydrogen-fueled Altair. 
By performing detailed analysis to determine the 
required size for stability at the bounding landing site 
terrains, and then developing and analyzing a detailed 
design, we were able to improve the mass 
confidence. As the team used the detailed design and 
began identifying assembly, integration, and test 
during both development and operations, we 
identified that the Constellation Program decision 
made early in LDAC-2 to increase the descent 
module diameter to take advantage of the 10m Ares 
V shroud had significant implications for 
transportation and thermal-vacuum propulsion 
system testing. That assessment found that the Altair 
descent module could not be transported in the 
NASA Super Guppy aircraft and would require barge 
transportation. To perform an acceptance test of each 
descent module propulsion system in the Plumbrook 
Station B2 test facility, the barge would require an 
ice breaker to clear a path through Lake Erie during 
the winter. These examples represent some of the 
more dramatic items that were revealed by allowing 
the NASA in-house team to perform significant 
detailed design work during the project formulation 
phase. 
Detailed design during pre-phase-A and early 
phase-A can identify performance characteristics that 
cannot be parametrically modeled and other 
important issues that cannot be determined until a 
design concept is of sufficient maturity to evaluate a 
more complete set of design, development, test, and 
evaluation considerations. 
As early as possible in the project formulation 
phase, a detailed design concept should be developed 
to allow a more complete understand of the 
performance and programmatic implications of the 
design. The concept needs to be more than an artist 
rendering based upon parametric design 
characteristics, it needs to have engineering design 
analysis substantiating it so that a design team is 
made of a subject matter experts with the experience 
to foresee the potential issues during DDT&E. 
 
IV.6  Industry should be brought into the process 
early. 
One of the early tenets of the Altair Project 
Office was to solicit input from industry throughout 
the project formulation phase. In June 2008, a little 
over a year after Altair was created, the office 
awarded Broad Area Announcement (BAA) contracts 
to five companies; three major traditional aerospace 
companies and two small, independent companies. 
The BAA had two primary objectives. The first asked 
the companies to review the government’s Lander 
Design Analysis Cycle (LDAC-1) minimum function 
lunar lander conceptual design, the plans for 
implementing risk-informed design, and to provide 
suggested alternative design concepts. The second 
asked the companies to provide recommendations for 
the roles and responsibilities of government and 
industry for the development of the lunar lander. A 
process was then set up whereby the companies that 
participated in the BAA and other entities meeting 
(International Traffic in Arms (ITAR) export control 
regulations could continually obtain updates on the 
government design. This two-way interaction was 
extremely valuable to both the government and 
industry – it provided the government some 
important alternative perspectives and it provided the 
industry information which helped them focus their 
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internal investment funding. The input from industry 
also helped shape the roles of the government and 
industry that were incorporated into the Altair 
acquisition strategy. As the Altair project proceeded 
into Phase A concept exploration and refinement, and 
while preparing for the System Requirements Review 
(SRR), it developed a process whereby multiple 
contractors would be integrated into the Altair Team 
to support the work. This process was being executed 
using a fixed cost procurement titled Altair 
Conceptual Design Contract (ACDC); this contract 
was ready for award in the Spring of 2009. This 
process would have maintained government 
leadership of the design until a prime contractor was 
selected for the flight vehicle development 
somewhere in the post-SRR timeframe, enabling the 
government team to develop a better Request for 
Proposals solicitation, and allowed all contractors 
greater in-sight into the information that the 
government was using to shape the requirements. In 
fact, during the Heavy Lift and Propulsion 
Technology Request for Information (HLPT RFI), 
two contractors specifically cited the Altair approach 
to NASA and industry working together during the 
early phase of a project as a good model. 
Although the ACDC contract was never 
executed, it was held up as a model of how 
government and industry could work cooperatively in 
the formulation phases of a large project. Industry 
should be invited into the process early to ensure the 
NASA project team in aware of alternative ideas and 
perspectives, and to help the help the contractor 
community better understand the basis of the 
requirements. So while the acquisition model that 
Altair was developing may not be appropriate for 
wide-spread application, the primary 
recommendation is that the project team should 
explore unique and creative ways for incorporating 
the industry community into the project as early as 
possible. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
During its 5 year existence as a critical element 
of NASA’s Constellation architecture, the Altair 
Lunar Lander project set out to change the way the 
Agency designs large-scale human spacecraft. 
Through the initial use of small, hand-selected 
“Skunkworks” team, the project was able to greatly 
reduce the size of a typical human spacecraft project 
office. By utilizing risk-informed design, the Altair 
team was able to approach the vehicle’s design from 
the bottoms-up with the knowledge of how every 
component contributes to the vehicle’s overall 
performance, cost, safety and reliability. The use of 
lander Design Analysis Cycles (LDACs) proved to be 
an effective method to implement the risk-based 
design process, and showed the importance of safety 
and risk analysis personnel very early in the design 
process. Altair also made creative use of small 
contracts with both traditional and startup aerospace 
companies to allow them to participate early in the 
lander design process. At the time of Constellation’s 
cancellation, the Altair project was preparing to 
further integrate multiple contractors into Phase B of 
the lander design.  
Though it is unfortunate that the Altair team did 
not see its lander become flight hardware, it is 
fortunate that the lessons learned from this unique 
design experience were captured in a succinct set of 
recommendations that may benefit future human 
spacecraft designers.  
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